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NAILING DOWN THE COFFIN LID:
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AFTER-ACQUIRED
EVIDENCE DOCTRINE IN TITLE VII LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine this scenario.' An African-American man (we'll call him
Smith) applies for a position in a factory and is hired. However, from the
first day on Smith encounters problems with his supervisor who is white.
The supervisor makes racially disparaging comments to others concerning
Smith and consistently assigns Smith the most menial assignments,
insinuating that these tasks are all he is capable of performing. When
Smith comes up for a review he receives poor marks from the supervisor
despite the fact that he has performed every task as well, if not better,
than the other workers in his department. Twice Smith is passed up for
promotions which are awarded to white workers with less seniority and
less experience. Finally, Smith has had enough. He confronts his
supervisor and expresses his frustration and outrage at the treatment he has
been accorded. The supervisor says nothing.
On the following day, Smith reports to work only to find that he has
been discharged. The reason given is an inability to get along with his
management and a generally poor attitude.
Smith then takes the
appropriate steps and files an action against his former employer, alleging
that he was discharged because of his race.2 Smith seems to have a
strong case against his former employer. However, during the pre-trial
discovery process the employer's attorneys become aware, for the first
time, of several misrepresentations made by Smith concerning his
educational background on his initial job application. The employer's
attorney presents this after-acquired evidence (so-called because it was not
discovered until after the employee's termination) to the court and asks for
summary judgment, for all intents and purposes admitting that Smith's
discharge was discriminatory in nature but arguing that, based on this
after-acquired evidence, had Smith's employers been aware of his
misrepresentations while he was employed they would never have hired
him in the first place or would have discharged him. The court grants the
employer's motion for summary judgment, effectively foreclosing the
employer's liability and defeating Smith's discrimination claim.
Such a scenario seems patently unfair. Smith was clearly the victim
of discrimination at the hands of his employer, yet evidence that was
totally unrelated to his discriminatory discharge was used to disqualify him
1. This hypothetical is based upon a compilation of several actual cases.
2. Smith would presumably be suing under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a) (1988), which
prohibits discharge based on race.
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from pursuing a civil rights claim. The employer was able to use this
evidence to escape any liability for its discriminatory employment
practices. Such a result would seem to run counter to our traditional view
of justice-that the victim should be compensated and the offender be
punished? However, until January 23, 1995, when the Supreme Court

unanimously decided McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co. 4 and
effectively abolished the after-acquired evidence doctrine, most courts
would have followed the hypothetical court's example and granted
summary judgment to the employer.5 Other courts would not have
allowed use of such evidence as a method of precluding an employer's
liability for a discriminatory employment practice, but would have allowed
the use of after-acquired evidence to reduce the amount of damages the
victim could recover. 6 The after-acquired evidence doctrine was first
accepted as an affirmative defense to an employment discrimination claim
by the Tenth Circuit in 1988.' In the past seven years employers had
been very successful in using the doctrine to totally defeat claims or
reduce damages in cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (Title VII),' which prohibits discrimination by employers based on
3. "Mhe general rule is, that when a wrong has been done.., the compensation
shall be equal to the injury... [tihe injured party is to be placed, as near as may be,
in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed."
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975) (quoting Wicker v.
Hoppock, 6 Wall. 94, 99 (1867)).
4. 115 S. Ct 879 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Johnsonv. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992);
Washington v. Lake County, Ill.,
969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Summers v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988); Bongerv. American Water Works,
789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992); McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797
F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), aff'd, 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct.
879 (1995); Churchman v. Pinkerton's Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1991).
6. See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992);
Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314 (D. N.J. 1993).
7. See Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
8. See, e.g., Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409; Washington v.
Lake County, Ill.,
969 F.2d 250; Bongerv. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102.
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certain protected characteristics. 9 As such, this doctrine had become a
10
valuable weapon for employers faced with Title VII litigation.
This note argues that the Supreme Court acted appropriately in

abolishing the after-acquired evidence doctrine because it was antithetical
to the purposes and history of Title VII."

Generally speaking, Title VII

was adopted with the intention of eradicating invidious discrimination,

primarily against blacks, 2 that existed in the area of employment at the
time. 3 By allowing employers to engage in discriminatory employment
practices with virtual impunity, the after-acquired evidence doctrine
undermined Title VII's first objective-to discourage employment
discrimination. 4

Additionally, successful application of the doctrine has meant that the
victim of employment discrimination would, at a minimum, have faced a
substantial reduction of any relief awarded,"5 and, in most circuits, would
have had his or her claim completely barred by the granting of summary
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). § 2000e-2(a) states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Id.
10. See, e.g., William M. Muth, Jr., Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine
in Title VII Cases and the Challenge Presentedby Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.,
968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), 72 NEB. L. Rnv. 330 (1993) (describing how employers
have been very successful in applying the doctrine to defeat employment discrimination
claims).
11. See EEOCv. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D. Ill. 1975) ("rMhe
primary objective of Title VII is the elimination of the major social ills of job
discrimination .... .").
12. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1972) ("Congress's primary
"
concern in enacting . . . Title VII . . . was with 'the plight of the Negro ...
(quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
13. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ("The objective
of Congress in the enactment of Title VII .. . was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees.").
14. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (describing
how remedial awards force noncompliant employers to evaluate their employment
practices and eradicate discrimination).
15. See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992)
(denying reinstatement, frontpay and injunctive relief to a victim of retaliatory
discharge).
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judgment to the employer. 6 This subverted the second purpose of Title
VII-to make the victim of employment discrimination "whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination" 1 -- by
punishing the victim for conduct that was unrelated to his or her
discriminatory discharge.
This note argues further that, despite the Supreme Court's recent
decision, the doctrine should be legislatively abolished as well. 8 Several
reasons can be extended as to why Congress should pass legislation to
proscribe the use of the after-acquired evidence doctrine in Title VII
litigation. First, notwithstanding the Court's unanimous decision in
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., a review of recent
Supreme Court decisions involving Title VII has shown the Court to be
unpredictable in its results.19 Second, an amendment to Title VII
proscribing the use of after-acquired evidence in employment
discrimination litigation would be consistent with earlier congressional
action that expanded the scope and deterrent effect of Title VII.2
Section II of this note examines Title VII. 2
It discusses the
circumstances surrounding the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the objectives of Title VII,1 and traces the expansion of Title VII
through the congressional amendments of 1972,' 1978,1 and 1991.1
The after-acquired evidence doctrine is examined in Section IH.' The
origins of the doctrine are discussed, and the competing viewpoints that
had been adopted by the circuits are analyzedY
Next, in Section IV the argument is made that the Supreme Court in
McKennon was correct in holding that after-acquired evidence of employee
16. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
17. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418.
18. See infra notes 320-29 and accompanying text.
19. See Howard A. Simon, Mixed Signals: The Supreme Court's 1991 Title VI
Decisions, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 207, 221 (describing how the Supreme Court seemed
to protect employees' rights in one case while denying them rights in another case).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 56-153.
21. See infra notes 32-153 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
23. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982)).
24. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. 111 1991)).
26. See infra notes 158-316 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 172-275 and accompanying text.
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misrepresentation or misconduct should not be admissible in employment
discrimination litigation for the purpose of barring a victim's claims,
because the doctrine subverted the twin purposes of Title VII-the
eradication of employment discrimination and the desire to fully
The effect of the doctrine on both the
compensate its victims."
perpetrator and the victim of employment discrimination is analyzed in
terms of the doctrine's incompatibility with the stated purposes and
legislative intent of Title VII.2 This section also asserts that despite the
Supreme Court's welcome ruling, the invalidation of the doctrine would
best be carried out by congressional action, in the form of an amendment
to Title VII?0 Finally, proposed legislation is introduced.

II. TITLE VII
A. Title WI-What Does It Provide For?
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 31 was enacted to counter
the long history of discrimination faced by minorities in the workforce. 2
The congressional effort to enact Title VII was bitter and hard-fought.3 3
Title VII prohibits employers,' employment agencies,3' and labor
unions' from engaging in discriminatory employment practices against
any individual on the basis of the individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.37 Certain exemptions, however, do apply.38
28. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (stating that
purpose of Title VII was to eliminate discrimination in the workforce and to make
victims of such discrimination whole).
29. See infra notes 276-316 and accompanying text.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 317-326.
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
32. See, e.g., Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and
1972: A CriticalAnalysis of the Legislative History andAdministration of the Law, 2
INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 2 ("[L]ong-established patterns of employment discrimination...
for generations had locked blacks and members of other minority groups into a
permanent state of economic depression.").
33. See id. at 1-5 (describing how Title VII had to overcome tremendous opposition
from conservative members of Congress and many employer groups, who felt that the
federal government would use its powers under the Act to intrude into the private sector).
34.
35.
36.
37.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
Id. § 2000e-2(b).
Id. § 2000e-2(c).
Id. § 2000e-2.
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Activity proscribed by Title VII includes, among others, a failure or
refusal to hire an individual on the basis of one or more of these protected
characteristics,3 9 the discharge of an employee for similar reasons," and
any classification of individuals, based on protected characteristics, that
adversely affects their status as employees. 41 An individual claiming to
be a victim of employment discrimination is accorded the legal right,
pursuant to Title VII, to undertake a private cause of action against his or
her employer,42 and if he or she can make out a prima facie case of
discrimination,' Title VII allows courts to administer a wide range of
remedies." This is in keeping with the broad purpose behind Title VII,
as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.' Griggs held that Title VII was designed to accomplish "the

removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial
or other impermissible classification."" Another important aspect of
Title VII was its creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity
38. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1988), which allowed discrimination on the
basis of religion, sex, or national origin (but not race) where such a factor was a "bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise...." Id.
39. Id. § 2000e-2.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
43. The requirements for proving a prima facie case of discrimination vary
according to the charge. For example, to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
discharge, plaintiffs must show that they were a member of a statutorily protected class,
that they were qualified for the position, that they were discharged, and that they were
replaced by someone outside the statutorily protected group. Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). This section states the following:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or
labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful
employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate.
Id.
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
46. Id.at 431.
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Commission (EEOC).4
The EEOC is the administrative agency
Until the 1972 Equal
responsible for the enforcement of Title VII.
Employment Opportunity Act,49 however, the EEOC was impotent in the
area of Title VII enforcement.'
Its functions were limited to
investigating charges of employment discrimination, 5 referring cases
involving a pattern of discrimination to the United States Attorney
General,52 and issuing guidelines detailing its interpretations of various
provisions of Title VII. 53 The 1972 Act, however, authorized the EEOC
to initiate litigation against a discriminatory employer if it could not secure
an acceptable conciliation agreement from the employer within 30 days of
a charge being filed with the EEOC.' The 1972 Act also gave the
EEOC the power to intervene on behalf of the aggrieved individual in a
private civil action against a non-governmental entity.55
B. Expansion of Title VII Through CongressionalAmendments
Title VII was enacted following an extended period of rancorous
debate,56 and its proponents in Congress were forced to compromise on
a number of key issues in order to secure its enactment.5 As a result;
the power to pursue the broadly stated goal of eradicating discrimination58
was considerably weaker than had been anticipated by its advocates.
Consequently, on three separate occasions Congress has expanded the
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (a) (1988).
48.
49.
sections
50.

Id. § 2000e-4 (g).
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered
of 42 U.S.C. (1988)) [hereinafter 1972 Act].
See, e.g., Hill, supra note 32, at 81-82.

51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1964).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
55. Id. § 2000e-4(g)(6).
56. See Hill, supra note 32, at 1 (describing Title VII as "the product of an epic
legislative struggle").
57. See id. at 2. Hill notes that Title VII was amended 105 times before it was
finally passed by Congress.
58. See id. at 32 (observing that efforts to improve the statute were begun soon after
Title VII was enacted).
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scope of Title VII through various amendments.59
amendment

was directed

at a different aspect

Although each
of employment

discrimination, taken as a whole they manifest a desire by Congress to
expand the classification and enforcement authority of Title VII.a)
1. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
The first significant amendment to Title VII occurred in 1972 with the

enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.61

The

1972 Act, which had also faced stiff opposition from business interests, 62

augmented Title VII in a number of ways. One significant feature of this
act was the increased enforcement powers accorded to the EEOC.' Prior
to the enactment of this amendment, the EEOC did not have much power
to punish employers who violated Title V1.1 This lack of enforcement
power caused many discrimination complaints to linger unresolved with
the EEOC.
59. See Jennifer Miyoko Follette, Complete Justice: Upholding the Principles of
Title VII Through Appropriate Treatment ofAfter-Acquired Evidence, 68 WASH. L. RnV.
651, 652 (1993) (discussing how the 1972 amendment reflected the commitment
Congress had made to eradicate discrimination from society); Robin Rogers, A Proposal
for Combatting Sexual Discriminationin the Military:Amendment of Title VI, 78 CAL.
L. REV. 165, 187 n.121 (1990) (noting how the 1972 and 1978 amendments served to
expand Title VII's scope).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 61-153.
61. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1988)).
62. See Hill, supra note 32, at 33 ("Business interests conducted an intensive
lobbying compaign [sic] against the various proposals to extend Title VII coverage,
provide enforcement power to the EEOC, or strengthen the antidiscrimination statute in
any way.").
63. See Marjorie H. Gordon, Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corporation:
Eviscerating Title VUI, 17 SuFFoLK UNw. L. REv. 987, 994-97 (1983) (noting that
Congress intended to strengthen the EEOC because its previous powers, which were
quite limited, had proven ineffective in deterring employers from ceasing employment
discrimination).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53 (describing limitations on EEOC's
power).
65. See Hill, supra note 32, at 33 ("Toward the end of 1971 the Commission was
handicapped by a backlog of more than 23,000 unresolved complaints of discrimination
.... ) (emphasis added).
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The 1972 Act attempted to cure the problem of the EEOC's
ineffectiveness.' The EEOC was given the authorization to initiate civil
actions in federal district courts against violators of Title VII.' The Act
established the Office of the General Counsel, which would exclusively
handle litigation for the EEOC.1 Litigation could only commence,
however, if the EEOC had not achieved a settlement through the
conciliation process within thirty days of a charge of employment
discrimination being filed with it by an aggrieved employee.' Once it
filed an action, the EEOC could seek injunctive relief and other remedies
for discriminatory practices conducted by employers and other categories
covered under Title VII.7' However, if the United States government or
a governmental agency was the alleged offender, the EEOC could not
pursue the action." Instead, such cases were to be transferred to the
Attorney General if efforts at conciliation failed.'
The 1972 Act also allowed private parties to join in EEOC
litigation.7' Similarly, the EEOC was given the power to intervene on
behalf of individuals in private civil suits "upon certification that the case
is of general public importance." 74
This granting of increased
enforcement power to the EEOC indicated that Congress wanted to
provide further incentives for employers and others to eliminate unlawful
employment practices. 5 The transformation of the EEOC into a lawenforcement agency would put an employer or other institution engaging
in unlawful employment practices on notice that they were now likely to
become embroiled in litigation against the United States government,
either as the plaintiff or as a party to the action.76 Another significant
provision of the 1972 Act was its expanded definitions of who was
covered under Title VII. As originally enacted, Title VII only applied to
66. See Follette, supra note 59, at 659 (describing how the 1972 Act transformed
the EEOC into a law-enforcement agency).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5()(1) (1988).
68. Id. § 2000e-4(b).
69. Id. § 2000e-5(0)(1).
70. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
71. Id. § 2000e-5(0(1).
72. Id.
73. Id.

74. Id.
75. See Gordon, supra note 63, at 994 (previous enforcement ability of EEOC had
been ineffective in providing incentives to stop employment discrimination).
76. See Hill, supra note 32, at 33 (discussing how the EEOC's lack of litigation
power forced Congress to amend Title VII "in order to achieve the purposes for which
it was originally enacted").
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those employers who continuously employed more than twenty-five
employees; however, the 1972 Act expanded the coverage of Title VII by

lowering the requisite number of employees to fifteen. 7

This change

was estimated to have extended Title VII coverage to an additional
several million private sector employees. 7" This expansion of Title VII
protection is "further evidence of the legislature's desire to expand the
reach of Title VII."'
The 1972 Act also extended Title VII coverage to state and local
government employees, who had been excluded from the original version

of Title VII. ° Federal employees were also granted rights under Title

VII, although they had to file their complaints through the Civil Service
Commission rather than the EEOC. 1 The 1972 Act also removed the
exemption for educational institutions,' although religious schools were
still exempted.'

Procedural changes wrought by the 1972 Act, while not as radical as
the substantive ones mentioned above, also served to provide an incentive
for aggrieved employees or applicants for employment to bring their
claims to the attention of the EEOC.M The first change extended the

statute of limitations on filing an employment discrimination charge with
the EEOC. 5 Previously, an individual who felt that he or she had been
the victim of an unlawful employment practice had to file a charge with
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) defines an employer as
"[A] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person
Id.
78. See Hill, supra note 32, at 52 (stating "[tihis expanded coverage adds an
estimated six million private industry employees to EEOC's jurisdiction").
79. See JoEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 32 (2d ed. 1987) [Hereinafter FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER]
(noting that Congress's actions in extending Title VII protection to more workers were
driven by a desire to hasten the demise of employment discrimination).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988).
81. Id. § 2000e-16(b).
82. Id. § 2000e-1 (a). See Hill, supra note 32, at 53 (stating "[e]mployees and
applicants for employment in teaching, administrative, and clerical positions in both
public and private school systems [were] brought under Title VII protection.").
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(e) (1988).
84. See Hill, supra note 32, at 54 (noting that the longer time period for filng
complaints with the EEOC was instituted in consideration of its frequent inability to act
within the earlier time period).
85. Id. § 2000e-5(e).
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the EEOC within 90 days of the alleged violation. 6 The 1972 Act
doubled the time period, so that now the individual has 180 days during
which to file the charge," and up to 300 days if he or she was required
to first file with a state or local fair employment practice agency." This
increased time period reflects the congressional determination to remove
obstacles in the path of those who allege that they have been the victims
of employment discrimination89 so as to encourage the main purpose of
Title VII-"to deter employers from discriminating in the workplace and
to eliminate unlawful employment practices."'
This determination is clearly seen in the final major provision of the
1972 Act. The amendment allowed for claims to be filed with the EEOC
not just by a person claiming to be aggrieved, as had been the case
previously, but also on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved. 91
This section was clearly amended to allow those individuals who had
reason to file a charge, but who may have been reluctant out of fear that
they might face retaliation by their employer, in other words, a way to
bring the alleged violations before the EEOC through a third party.'
The alleged victim would not be identified in the charge, but the EEOC
would obtain his or her name from the third party. 3 The alleged
victim's name would remain confidential, however. 4 In this way, more
allegations of employment discrimination would be revealed, and violators
would be put on notice that they would not be able to intimidate their
workers through scare tactics anymore. This serves to further the
86. Id. See Hill, supranote 32, at 53 (describing the pre-1972 Act procedures for
filing claims with the EEOC).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988).
88. Id.
89. See supranote 84. EEOC's well-known difficulties with processing complaints
led to the failure of many alleged victims of employment discrimination to file
complaints. Id.
90. Larry M. Parsons, Note, Title VII Remedies: Reinstatement and the Innocent
Incumbent Employee, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1447-48 (1989).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
92. See Hill, supranote 32, at 54 (alleged victim's name would be kept confidential
as "aprotection against reprisals").
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
94. Id. § 2000e-5(b) states that personal information provided to the EEOC would
not be released without the aggrieved individual's consent, and provides for a possible
fine or prison sentence for anyone who reveals such confidential information.
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overarching goal of Title VII-"to eradicate employment discrimination
"95

The 1972 Act went a long way towards redressing the limitations of
Title VII as originally enacted.' Its provisions made filing a charge of
employment discrimination more attractive and more convenient, and at

last empowered the EEOC to deal effectively with employment
discrimination.'
2. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978

The next major amendment of Title VII occurred in 1978 with the
enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.98 The 1978 Act
was a response to the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in a case
decided two years earlier.' In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert," the

Court held that discrimination against pregnant women in a disability
benefits plan did not constitute sex-based discrimination under Title

VII. 10° General Electric provided a disability plan for its employees that

paid benefits for non-work related illnesses and accidents. 11 The plan
did not, however, extend to disabilities stemming from pregnancies. 103

A number of past and present female employees, who had been denied
payments to cover the time off they required during their pregnancies,

brought an action against General Electric, alleging that its exclusion of
pregnancy-related disabilities violated Title VII

4

The district court

95. Steven G. Anderson, Tester Standing Under Title Vii: A Rose by Any Other
Name, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1217, 1238 (1992) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 6328, 1592
(statement of Rep. Corman)).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60, 63-97.
97. See supra notes 63-95 and accompanying text.
98. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982))
[hereinafter 1978 Act].
99. See Patricia J. Bejarano, Labor Pains:The Rights of the PregnantEmployee, 43
LAB. L.J. 780, 781 (1992) (1978 legislation enacted following intensive lobbying
campaign by womens' rights groups following the Supreme Court's decision in General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977)).
100. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977).
101. GeneralElec. Co., 429 U.S. at 125 (1976).
102. Id. at 127.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 128.
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agreed, holding that the exclusion constituted sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII." The court of appeals affirmed."°
The Supreme Court reversed, 7 holding that "it is impossible to
find any gender-based discriminatory effect in this scheme simply because
women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive benefits; that is
to say, gender-based discrimination does not result simply because an

employer's ..

plan is less than all-inclusive."Io'

In the wake of this decision, women's rights groups were
outraged. 9 After intensive lobbying efforts, Congress enacted the 1978
Act."1 ' The 1978 Act accorded pregnant women protection equivalent
to that provided to other aggrieved individuals under Title VII." The
1978 Act, then, similar to the 1972 Act, served to broaden the scope of
Title VII, in keeping with the purposes of Title VII as noted by the Court
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody:
to "eradicate discriminatory

employment practices" 13 and "to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination."11
3. The Civil Rights Act of 1991

Most recently, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,"5 a
far-reaching amendment whose principal purpose was to reverse the effect
of a number of then-recent Supreme Court decisions 1 that were seen
105. See General Elee. Co. v. Gilbert, 375 F. Supp. 367, 385-86, aff'd, 519 F.2d
661, rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977).
106. GeneralElec. Co., 519 F.2d 661.
107. GeneralElec. Co., 429 U.S. 125.
108. Id. at 138-39.
109. See Bejarano, supra note 99, at 781.
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 59, at 187 n.121 ("Congress . . . plac[ed]
pregnant women decisively within [Title VII's] protection by passing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 ....
112. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
113. Id. at 417.
114. Id. at 418.
115. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1991)) [hereinafter 1991 CRA].
116. Some of the Supreme Court decisions that led to the 1991 Civil Rights Act
included EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (court held Title VII did
not protect American citizens working for American employers outside the territorial
borders of the United States); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989) (court altered burden of proof applicable to disparate impact theory of
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as having "unduly narrowed the rights of individuals to protect themselves

from employment discrimination."17

However, the 1991 CRA went

beyond specifically dealing with past Supreme Court decisions and

expanded the scope of Title VII once again."' For the purposes of this
note, several provisions are relevant.
The 1991 CRA allowed aggrieved individuals claiming intentional
discrimination to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the first

time.119 Previously, this had not been an option for alleged victims of
employment discrimination."

This effort to dramatically expand the

amount of damages a victim of intentional employment discrimination
might potentially recover if he or she could establish intentional
discrimination helped serve the twin purposes of Title VII-eradicating
employment discrimination and making its victims whole."' By vastly
increasing the amount of damages a victim could be awarded, this
provision was likely to result in more litigation by aggrieved individuals
against their employers." A corollary to this would be the notion that
employers, when faced with the prospect of having to pay out large
awards for compensatory and punitive damages, would have an increased
incentive to eliminate unlawful employment practices from their
environs.123
The 1991 CRA also provided that either party could demand a jury
trial if compensatory or punitive damages were being sought by the
discrimination); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (court allowed
employer to avoid liability in mixed-motive cases).
117. Lax K. LARSON, CIvIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1991, at 5 (1992) (stating that recent
court decisions had been adverse to the interests of alleged victims of employment
discrimination).
118. See Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: What Does It Mean
and What Is Its Likely Impact?, 71 NEB. L. REv. 304, 306 (1992) (observing that the
1991 CRA "was intended to go well beyond simply reversing" the recent decisions by
the Supreme Court, by adding remedies and allowing for jury trials in some cases).
119. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
120. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice Brennan noting that
plaintiffs in Title VII litigations were limited to recovering only back-pay); Richard L.
Neumeier, Civil Rights Act of 1991: What Does It Do? Is It Retroactive?, 59 DEF.
CouNs. J.500, 504 (1992) ("Title VII . ..was carefully drafted to provide only for
equitable relief.").
121. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
122. See LARSON, supra note 117, at 11 (stating Congress's belief that the existing
remedies were not substantial enough for many individuals to bother pursuing litigation).
123. See Loudon, supranote 118, at 321 (stating that the increased remedies would
certainly lead to a rise in litigation).
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aggrieved individual."l
Previously, such individuals were not
guaranteed the right to a jury trial in Title VII cases." s This right was
initially denied on the theory that Title VII plaintiffs, who (at least in the
early days of Title VID) were generally minorities, would not stand much
of an opportunity for a fair trial in the courts of the South. 1"
By allowing the right to a jury trial in cases involving intentional
discrimination, the 1991 CRA provided a further incentive for aggrieved
individuals to press their claims against discriminatory employers." 2
This is evidenced by section 1981a(c)(2), which provided that in Title VII
jury trials dealing with compensatory and punitive damages, the jury could
not be informed of the statutory caps set on those damages."
According to one commentator, the motive behind this provision was that
"Congress was afraid that juries would be influenced by the size of the
caps to unduly increase their awards."29 Congress, then, realized that
the jury trial option would be very favorable to plaintiffs, and felt
compelled to keep the awards down to reasonable levels. 1" The right
to a jury trial will also serve to deter unlawful employment practices for
the same reasons that make it such an attractive option for plaintiffs. 3 '
124. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981A(c)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
125. The Seventh Amendment does not guarantee the right to a jury trial if only
equitable damages are at stake. See Neumeier, supra note 120, at 504 (noting that Title
VII was "carefully drafted to provide only for equitable relief"). Prior to the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, the Supreme Court had never held that a plaintiff seeking equitable relief
under Title VII had a constitutionally-guaranteed right to a jury trial. See Teamsters v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 572 (1989) (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581-82
(1978)).
126. See Neumeier, supra note 120, at 504. Neumeier states that when Title VII
was drafted, its drafters did not "[perceive] that plaintiffs would meet with much success
in discrimination claims in Southern states." Id.
127. Id. (describing how commentators have stated that "jury trials will favor
plaintiffs"); Loudon, supra note 118, at 312 ("The availability of trial by jury is a
significant victory for the plaintiffs' bar. It is a well-known fact that juries tend to be
more sympathetic to the 'little guy,' as opposed to the 'heartless' corporate entity.").
128. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(c)(2) (West Supp. 1993). Congress placed a sliding
scale on the maximum amount of compensatory and punitive damages a plaintiff could
recover. The award was capped at between $50,000 and $300,000, and was calculated
by the number of employees continuously employed by the violative employer. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
129. LARSON, supra note 117, at 17.
130. See id.
131. See Loudon, supra note 118, at 312.
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For employers, "[t]he odds of prevailing in employment discrimination
cases ... will now be significantly reduced."132
Another provision of the 1991 CRA was aimed directly at the
Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 13
where the Court ruled that Title VII's protection did not extend to
American employees of American employers outside the boundaries of the
United States. 134 The 1991 CRA legislatively overruled this potentially
wide-ranging decision by amending the definition of employee to include
United States citizens employed in a foreign country. 35 This amended
provision also extended protection to American employees of foreign
corporations controlled by an American employer, 36 again manifesting
the commitment Congress has made toward eradicating employment
discrimination.137
Most significantly, for purposes of this note, the 1991 CRA overruled
the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.131 Price
Waterhouse concerned a charge of employment discrimination where there
were mixed-motives; that is, "when it has been shown that an employment
decision resulted from a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
motives.""' In Price Waterhouse, the respondent, Anne Hopkins, was
a senior manager in petitioner's office."
Hopkins was proposed for
partnership in 1982, but was neither offered nor denied the position;
rather, she was to await reconsideration in 1983.4
Hopkins brought
her suit after the partners in her office refused to repropose her for
partnership, claiming that Price Waterhouse had discriminated against her
on the basis of sex."
Price Waterhouse argued that Hopkins was
132. Id.
133. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
134. See id.
135. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-(f) (West Supp. 1993) states that "with respect to
employment in a foreign country, such term [employee] includes an individual who is a
citizen of the United States." Id. § 2000e-().
136. Id. § 2000e-1(c)(1).
137. See Loudon, supra note 118, at 316.
138. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
139. Id. at 232.
140. See id. at 231.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 235. Examples of Hopkins' allegations included that she was described
by one partner as "macho," she was told by another that she "overcompensated for being
a woman," and yet another partner informed her that if she wanted to improve her
chances of making partner she had better "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id.
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passed over for partnership because she had problems in her professional
relationship with coworkers. 143
The Court felt that Hopkins had successfully established that her
gender had played a part in her being denied a partnership position;
nonetheless, the Court allowed her employer a way to avoid liability for
violation of Title VII, if Price Waterhouse could establish "by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision
even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account . . . ,"44 On
this basis, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. 145
Congress responded to the Price Waterhouse decision by including
language in the 1991 CRA stating that "an unlawful employment practice
is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice."" 4
Thus, an employer today cannot use evidence of a
legitimate motive to avoid liability for an employment practice when a
protected characteristic was also part of the motivation behind the
conduct. 7
However, if an employer establishes that he or she "would have taken
the same action in the absence of the permissible factor," 148 the
aggrieved employee is limited to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
attorney's fees. 49 This provision was ostensibly included to avoid
granting employees a windfall in situations where they were discharged for
both poor work performance and for a discriminatory motive. 1" If the
employer could establish that the employee was discharged based on his
sub-par work performance alone, allowing the employee to recover
damages such as back-pay"' or frontpay 52 would serve to do more
143. Id. at 234. Staff members felt that too often "Hopkins' aggressiveness spilled
over into abrasiveness ... [and partners] had counseled her to improve her relations
with staff members." Id.
144. Id. at 258.
145. See id. On remand, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia ordered Price Waterhouse to install Ms. Hopkins as a partner. Hopkins v.
Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.C. 1990).
146. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West Supp. 1993).
147. See Neumeier, supra note 120, at 501.
148. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1993).
149. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
150. See infra note 158.
151. Back-pay is defined as "the total economic compensation the individual would
have earned ... from the date the individual is denied a position or discharged to the
date of a court decree awarding the position or reinstatement." Follette, supra note 59,
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than make him or her whole for any discrimination suffered. Instead, it
would make him better off by virtue of his protected characteristic, and
this was not the intention of Title VII.' 53
4. Amendments to Title VII-Reaffirming Congress's Commitment
The 1991 CRA was a broad effort by Congress to ensure that thenrecent decisions handed down by the Supreme Court would not diminish
the rights of alleged victims of employment discrimination.'S By
adding new provisions for damages and reversing Supreme Court attempts
to limit employer's liability for unlawful employment practices, Congress
greatly increased the risks that employers would confront if they continued
to engage in such violative practices. 55
As such, the 1991 amendments were only the latest in a series of
congressional actions that went a long way towards reaffirming Congress's
commitment to the twin aims of Title VII, as expressed by the Supreme
Court in 1975-to "eradicate discriminatory employment practices"' 56
and "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination."157

at 654 n.12.
152. Frontpay has been defined as "damages for wages lost either where plaintiff
is awarded reinstatement but for one reason or another the position is unavailable for
some time, or where the plaintiff has acquired another job at lesser pay." Massey v.
Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 318 n.4 (D. N.J. 1993).
153. See LARSON, supra note 117, at 31. Larson states that the reason behind
limiting damages in such a situation is to "[avoid] placing the employee in a better
position than he or she would have been in had the employer not acted in a
discriminatory manner." Id.
154. See id. at 5 (describing the 1991 CRA as having a "profound and far-reaching"
effect on employment discrimination); see supra note 116.
155. See Loudon, supra note 118, at 321. Discussing the recently-enacted 1991
CRA, Loudon observed that "the price of discrimination has just increased a thousandfold. With the availability of compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional
discrimination ... coupled with the availability of jury trials in such cases, employers
are certain to see an increase in employment litigation." Id.
156. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
157. Id. at 418.
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HI.

THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINE

A. Origins of the After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine:
Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle
Although after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct was first
used as an affirmative defense against a Title VII action in 1988,158 its
origins date back to 1977, when the Supreme Court decided Mount
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.159

The first

court to articulate the after-acquired evidence doctrine utilized Mount
Healthy to a great degree in reaching its decision; 1"
thus it is
worthwhile to examine the facts of the case.
Fred Doyle was an untenured teacher who was discharged by the
Mount Healthy school district for both constitutionally-protected conduct
and conduct that was not accorded any such protection.161 He brought
an action against his former employer, seeking reinstatement and
damages.16 Doyle claimed that the school district's refusal to rehire
him constituted a violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court vacated
the lower 1court's
judgment
that Doyle was entitled to reinstatement with
4
back-pay. 6
The Court feared that reinstatement of Doyle, when he could have
been discharged based solely on his unprotected conduct, might very well
place Doyle "in a better position as a result of the exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he
done nothing." 1
According to the Court, Doyle had the burden of
establishing that an illegal motive was a substantial factor in the school
158. See Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.
1988) (discovery of former employee's falsifications defeated his Title VII claim).
159. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
160. See Muth, supra note 10, at 334 (describing how the Summers court used
language from the Mount Healthy decision to guide its application of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine to Title VII cases).
161. See Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274. Doyle was dismissed following several
incidents that occurred while he was employed as a teacher. Id. Among these were
altercations with fellow teachers, staff members and students, as well as a telephone call
Doyle made to a local radio station, wherein he conveyed the contents of an internal
memorandum concerning teacher dress code and appearance. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 287.
165. Id. at 285.
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district's decision to discharge him.1 " Doyle was found to have met
this burden. 67 However, the Court felt that the district court should
have taken this analysis one step further and "determine[d] whether the
Board had shown... that it would have reached the same decision...
even in the absence of the protected conduct."1
If the school district
could establish that, indeed, it would have discharged Doyle based solely
on the conduct that was not protected under the Constitution, then the
discharge could not be the basis for any relief."W This reasoning was
applied, some would say erroneously, 70 by the court in Summers v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 171
B. Opening the Floodgates:
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Summers v. State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co.11 has been
regarded as the "seminal case regarding an employer's use of . . .
evidence discovered after commencement
of an employment
discrimination action."" In the wake of this case, employers had been
able to use the after-acquired evidence to defeat (or reduce the damages
in) Title VII claims in a laige number of cases.1 74
Ray Summers was a field claims representative for State Farm, a
position he had held for nearly twenty years. 175 Between 1963 and
166. See id. at 287.
167. See id. Doyle had proven this burden by establishing that his delivery of the
message concerning the proposed dress code to the radio station constituted conduct that
was protected by the First Amendment. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. On remand, the district court found that the school board had met this
burden, and consequently denied Doyle any relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. See
Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 706 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988).
170. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 1992)
(stating-that the Summers court misconstrued the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's
decision in Mt. Healthy).
171. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
172. Id.
173. Elizabeth Pryor Johnson, After-Acquired Evidence of Employee Misconduct:
Affirmative Defense or Limitation on Remedies?, FLA. B.J., June 1993, at 76.
174. See Tim A. Baker, New Defense to Discrimination Suits, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1993, at 44 (describing the number of cases making use of the doctrine as
'overwhelming").
175. Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 702 (10th Cir.
1988).

19941

NOTE: AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE

1980, Summers had an unblemished work record. 6 In July of 1980,
however, State Farm discovered that Summers had committed a
forgery." 7 Summers did not deny having committed the falsification;
State Farm let him off with a warning that another instance of forgery
could result in his discharge.1 78 The next year, State Farm was made
aware of a 1977 incident in which Summers had committed another
falsification. He was warned again that further forgeries would result in
his dismissal." 9 Following this latest discovery, State Farm reviewed
past files and discovered more instances of forgery by Summers.'1°
Summers was not dismissed, however; rather, he was warned yet again
and was placed on two week probation without salary."' Following his
return from probation, Summers continued to work for State Farm until
his discharge on May 19, 1982 .11 The reason State Farm offered for
its discharge was not the several instances of falsification, but rather "his
poor attitude, inability to get along with fellow employees and customers,
and similar problems in dealing with the public and coworkers.""
Summers brought an action against State Farm, alleging that he was
discharged on the basis of age and religion."8 Nearly four years later,
during the pre-trial discovery process, State Farm discovered more than
one hundred fifty additional instances of falsification committed by
Summers. 1 Summers attempted to suppress the admissibility of these
falsifications as evidence at trial.186 Meanwhile, State Farm moved for
sumnary judgment based upon these additional forgeries."rr The district
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

180. Id.
181. Id. Apparently, Summers was not discharged for his misconductbecausethere
was no evidence that he had personally profited from any of the falsifications. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 702-03.
184. Id. at 702. Summers claimed that he was the victim of discrimination based
on his age and religion. Id. At the time of discharge, Summers was 56 years old;
moreover, he was a member of the Mormon Church. Id.
185. Id.at 703. Eighteen of these falsifications were found to have occurred after
Summers returned to employment following his probation. Id.
186. Id.

187. Id.
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court granted State Farm's request for summary judgment, and Summers
appealed."'
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. 18 9 The court
agreed with State Farm's argument that, although the evidence of the one
hundred fifty falsifications could not have been the cause of Summer's
discharge, by virtue of it not having been discovered until four years after
his dismissal, it was relevant to his claim of injury and therefore
foreclosed the grant of any relief or remedy to Summers. 11 In so
ruling, the court rejected Summers' argument that, "since they were not
discovered until 1986, these additional falsifications [were] irrelevant and
inadmissible, and that . . . the fact finder should not even know of
them."19 1 The court viewed such a request as "utterly unrealistic." 1"
Although it assumed that State Farm's motive for discharging Summers
was at least partly discriminatory, the court, nonetheless, found that
Summers was not entitled to relief because the after-acquired evidence of
the additional falsifications established that Summers continued to engage
in misconduct after he was warned that such misbehavior would lead to
his dismissal. 1" The court ended its opinion with a hypothetical that has
been cited approvingly in a number of subsequent cases:
The present case is akin to the hypothetical wherein a company
doctor is fired because of his age, race, religion, and sex and the
company, in defending a civil rights action, thereafter discovers
that the discharged employee was not a "doctor." In our view,
the masquerading doctor would be entitled to no relief, and
Summers is in no better position." 9
C. The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine Following Summers:
The Floodgates are Open
In the years following the Summers decision that after-acquired
evidence of employee misrepresentation or misconduct could bar
employment discrimination claims, the doctrine had been increasingly
utilized by employers seeking to avoid liability for their unlawful
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
See id. at 701.
See id. at 708.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 708.
See id.
Id.
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employment practices.195 The doctrine had thus become a valuable
weapon in employer's arsenals. 19 Since 1988, the Summers doctrine
had been adopted, in varying degrees, by three additional circuits: the
While these circuits had
Seventh, 19 and Eleventh." 9
Sixth, 197
generally agreed that after-acquired evidence of employee
misrepresentation or misconduct may be admitted in Title VII cases, they
disagreed on the weight such evidence should carry.'

1. The Sixth Circuit
In Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.,"' the Sixth
Circuit applied the after-acquired evidence doctrine to a state civil rights
claim.' Although the court followed the Summers rationale that afteracquired evidence of employee misrepresentation or misconduct could
preclude the plaintiff's recovery, in Johnson it added an extra burden that
the employer would have to meet in order to obtain summary
195. See Muth, supra note 10, at 332 n.4 ("The number of cases construing the
doctrine has increased each year since its introduction into Title VII cases by
Summers."); William S. Waldo & Rosemary A. Mahar, Lost Cause andFound Defense:
Using EvidenceDiscoveredAfter anEmployee'sDischargeto BarDiscriminationClaims,
9 LAB. L.J. 31, 31 (1993) ("At least sixteen federal and state courts have flatly dismissed
discrimination claims ...based solely on evidence that the employer neither knew about
nor relied on at the time it terminated the employee.") Id.
196. See George D. Mesritz, "After-Acquired" Evidence of Pre-Employment
Misrepresentations:An Effective Defense against Wrongful Discharge Claims, 18
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 215, 216 (1992) (describing how the doctrine has become "an
effective defense against lawsuits filed by employees .... ") Id.
197. See, e.g., Johnsonv. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992)
(summary judgment granted to employer upon discovery that former employee had lied
about her educational achievement).
198. See, e.g., Washington v. Lake County, Ili., 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992)
(former employee's misrepresentations as to prior convictions barred him from any
relieO.
199. See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992)
(employer's motion for summary judgment not granted upon discovery of former
employee's resume fraud).
200. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text; see also Massey v. Trump's
Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 321 (D. N.J. 1993) (after-acquired evidence
could not be used to bar Title VII claims).
201. 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
202. Id. at 411 (plaintiff claimed retaliatory discharge in violation of Michigan civil
rights provision).
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judgment.'
The employer would only be entitled to summary
judgment if it could successfully establish that the "misrepresentation or
omission was material, directly related to measuring a candidate for
employment, and was relied upon by [the] employer in making the hiring
decision. "I The Johnson court felt that this showing of materiality was
necessary to avoid situations in which employers would "[comb] a
discharged employee's record for evidence of any and all
misrepresentations, no matter how minor or trivial, in an effort to avoid
legal responsibility for an otherwise illegal discharge."' 5
Mildred Johnson was employed by Honeywell as a field relations
manager between 1976 and 1984.1 Part of her job function was to
provide assistance to the company's branch managers in instituting
affirmative action programs and responding to EEOC charges.'
Her
performance reviews were consistently positive until 1983, when Johnson
was accused of being uncooperative, hard to reach, and generally
ineffective."
Subsequent reviews were inconclusive concerning her
performance.0 9
On November 2, 1984, Johnson was discharged."
The reason
proffered by Honeywell was her continued poor performance. 1
Johnson, on the other hand, maintained that her job performance had been
satisfactory throughout her employment, and brought a civil rights action
against Honeywell on grounds of retaliatory discharge in violation of the
Elliot-Larson Civil Rights Act,21
Michigan's equivalent to Title
203. See id. at 414.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 411.
207. Id. Ironically, Johnson had the responsibility of dealing with employment
discrimination charges brought against Honeywell.
208. Id.
209. Id. While some later reviews showed that Johnson had made a significant
effort to improve, others showed little change in her performance.
210. Id. Johnson was dismissed after refusing the company's request that she
voluntarily resign.
211. Id. Honeywell specifically alleged that Johnson had refused to follow the
directions of one of her supervisors.
212. M.C.L.A. § 37.2701(a) (West Supp. 1993). The section makes illegal the
discharge of a person "because the person has opposed a violation of this act, or because
the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this act." Id. The court noted that Michigan
state courts looked to Title VII to resolve questions concerning the Michigan legislation,
and thus interpreted the Elliot-Larson Act "in the same manner as its federal
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Johnson claimed that the motivating factor in her racially-

motivated discharge was a series of conflicts she had gotten into with
certain branch managers.2 14
While preparing for trial, Honeywell discovered several instances of

misrepresentation in Johnson's employment application. 215

With this

after-acquired evidence in hand, Honeywell moved for summary
judgment, arguing that Johnson's misrepresentations barred any relief for
her.2 16 The district court denied the motion, but later granted a directed

verdict in Honeywell's favor on the civil rights claim, holding that

Johnson had failed to establish that Honeywell's reasons for firing her
were just a pretext for the alleged retaliatory discharge. 1 7
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied the rationale in Summers and held
that Johnson's resume fraud barred her recovery under the Michigan civil
rights legislation, even if she could have made out a claim. 2 ' The court

believed that summary judgment for Honeywell was appropriate in this

case because Honeywell had established materiality. 1 9
By its holding in Johnson, the Sixth Circuit effectively reversed the
district court's judgment in Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological
Johnson
University,'2 which had rejected the Summers approach."
was decided by the Sixth Circuit while Milligan-Jensen was on
counterpart." Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 415 n.1 (6th Cir.
1992).
213. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 411. Johnson's action, which also alleged that her
retaliatory discharge breached an employment contract stating that she could only be
discharged for cause, was originally brought in state court and was removed to federal
court by Honeywell.
214. Id. According to Johnson, several branch managers were very reluctant to
comply with her efforts to meet affirmative action hiring goals. She felt that her
discharge was in retaliation for her aggressive approach towards meeting those goals.
215. See id. at 411-12. Johnson had lied about her educational achievements,
claiming to have held a bachelor's degree from one college when in fact she had only
taken four classes there.
216. See id. at 412.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 415. The court also held that Johnson had failed to state a prima
facie claim under the Elliot-Larson Act.
219. See id.
220. 767 F. Supp. 1403 (W.D. Mich. 1991), rev'd 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2991 (1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993).
221. See Milligan-Jensen, 767 F. Supp. 1403, 1416 (court noting that Summers was
distinguishable from the instant case).
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appeal.'
The Sixth Circuit, when deciding Milligan-Jensen on appeal,
felt that its holding in Johnson necessarily precluded the district court's
approach, which, instead of allowing after-acquired evidence of employee
misrepresentation to bar plaintiff's entire claim, only allowed its use to
reduce the plaintiff's damages by half.
The district court chose this
application of the doctrine because the trial court had found that there was
direct evidence of sex discrimination against the plaintiff.'
Faced with
this discrimination, as well as the fact that the employer had failed to
establish that it would have discharged the plaintiff absent the
discriminatory motive, the trial judge held that he "[would] not deny relief
to a plaintiff found to have been wronged."'" This approach was seen
as "strik[ing] a middle ground . . . . "
Unfortunately, this novel
approach was not reached by the Sixth Circuit, which held that the
Johnson decision "require[d] that the case be reversed . . . .
However, it appears that, had the Sixth Circuit reached the merits of the
case, it would have rejected the district court's approach.'
2. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit also adopted the Summers approach, but, similar
to the Sixth Circuit in Johnson, required employers seeking summary
judgment to meet a more stringent standard. 9 In Washington v. Lake
County, Ill.,'
the court held that, regardless of whether the afteracquired evidence involved misrepresentation or misconduct, such
evidence would bar the employee's discrimination claim only if the
222. See Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d at 303.
223. See Milligan-Jensen, 767 F. Supp. at 1417 (back-pay award reduced under
court's equitable power).
224. See id.
225. Id. at 1417.
226. Id.
227. Milligan-Jensen, 975 F.2d 302, 303.
228. See Muth, supra note 10, at 339 n.46 (describing how the circuit court
indicated its dislike of the arbitrary decision reached by the trial court by comparing it
to the biblical story of King Solomon dividing a baby whose mother's identity was
uncertain).
229. See Washington v. Lake County, III., 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992) (employer
had burden of proving that employee would have been discharged upon discovery of
misconduct or misrepresentation).
230. Id.
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employer could establish that it would have discharged the employee if it
had known of his or her actions. 231
Eddie Washington was hired by the Lake County, Illinois Sheriff's
Department (the "Department") in September 1986.32 The employment
application Washington filled out asked whether he had ever been
convicted of a criminal offense. 3 Washington answered that he had
not, when in reality he had been convicted twice before.'
Washington
continued to work as a jailer until he was discharged in July 1987. 3
The Department stated that he was discharged because his recent arrest for
criminal sexual assault had brought "discredit to the Department,"236
and, furthermore, his file showed several instances when he had violated
Department policy.237
Washington filed an action under Title VII, alleging that the
Department had discriminated against him because of his race."3 He
claimed that members of the Department had singled him out because he
was African-American, and that they had falsely characterized incidents
reported in his personnel file.23 9 Washington also compared his situation
to that of another member of the Department, a white, who had been
arrested for driving while intoxicated.'
During the discovery process, the Department became aware of
Washington's past convictions for criminal offenses and moved for
summary judgment."' This motion was granted by the district court,
231. See id. at 256.
232. Id. at 251.
233. Id. at 251-252.
234. Id. at 252. Washington had been convicted of criminal trespass in 1974, for
which he was fined $100, and third-degree assault in 1981, for which he received a 28
day sentence which was suspended in place of two years probation.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. Washington was an African-American. See text accompanying notes 24445.
239. See id. Washington pointed out that in his most recent performance review,
which took place less than two months before his discharge, all his ratings were either
excellent or proficient, and the review made no mention of any violations of Department
policy.
240. Id. Officer Linda Blau, a white woman, was suspended three days for her
misconduct. By contrast, Washington was allegedly discharged because of his criminal
sexual assault arrest, even though the complainant dropped the charges shortly
afterwards.
241. See id. at 251.
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which held that even if Washington had been fired on account of his race,
his misrepresentations barred him from any relief. 2 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, 3 holding that the
proper question to ask in cases of employee misrepresentation was whether

the defendant, acting in a race-neutral manner, would have fired the
employee had it discovered the misrepresentation during his or her

employment.'

The court thus rejected the would-not-have-hired

standard, 5 which granted employers summary judgment if they
established that had they been aware of an employee's resume fraud they
would not have hired that employee in the first place.'
This standard

of proof, which would be more difficult for the employer to meet, was
adopted by the Washington court because it believed that "there are many
situations... in which an employer would not discharge an employee if
it subsequently discovered resume fraud, although the employee would not
have been hired absent that resume fraud." 7 The court felt that to focus
on whether the plaintiff would have been hired in the first place, as the

Summers court had done, would wrongly incorporate property right
concepts into employment discrimination law. 8 The circuit also
implied, in a rather offhand way, that a plaintiff who could successfully
establish discrimination would be entitled to back-pay between the time
of his or her discharge and the time that the after-acquired evidence was
discovered.2 9

242. See id.
243. See id. at 257.
244. See id. at 255. In this case, the court held that the Department's evidence
(several affidavits stating that knowledge of Washington's criminal past would certainly
have led to his discharge) established that Washington would indeed have been
discharged had his resume fraud come to light during his employment with the
Department.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 253 n.2 ("If Title VII is meant to eradicate discrimination in
employment, then the acts of the employers in [Summers and its progeny] must be illegal
.... ") (quoting Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The InterpretationofAction and the
Mixed Motives Problem in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 70 TEx. L. REV. 17, 97
(1991)).
247. Id. at 256 n.5 (quoting Bongerv. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102,
1102 (D. Colo. 1992)).
248. See id. at 256. The court felt that a property right in one's job was not
required to show an injury in a federal discrimination claim, because Title VII was silent
on the issue.
249. See id. at 253, n.2. Apparently, however, Washington never brought up the
issue of back-pay in his complaint, and the court did not have to consider it.
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3. The Eleventh Circuit
Until the recent Supreme Court decision in McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Publishing Co.,' the Eleventh Circuit had stood alone as the
only federal appellate-level court that had rejected outright the Tenth
Circuit's application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine. 1 In
Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.,212 the court made clear its belief
that the Summers court had incorrectly applied the Supreme Court's
holding in Mount Healthy to the facts before it, and held that afteracquired evidence of employee misrepresentation or misconduct could not
bar a plaintiff's employment discrimination claim 53 Instead, such
evidence could only be used to reduce the damages available to the
plaintiff.'
The plaintiff in Wallace, a woman, was employed as a flagperson on
a highway construction crew.5 Shortly after her termination, she
brought suit against her former employer, claiming several causes of
action, including sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge. 6 During
its deposition of the plaintiff, her former employer became aware for the
first time of misrepresentations she had made concerning her criminal
background5 7
Relying on the Tenth Circuit's holding in Summers, the employer
moved for partial summary judgment. 2" The district court denied the
employer's motion. 9 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the
after-acquired evidence of the plaintiff's resume fraud could only be used
to bar certain remedies.'
The court held that the Summers approach,
which would deny all relief to victims of unlawful employment practices,
250. 115 S.Ct. 879 (1995).
251. See Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992). The
Eleventh Circuit's approach has thus far been adopted by one federal district court. See
Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314 (D. N.J. 1993).
252. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
253. See id.at 1181.
254. See id.
255. Id.at 1184.
256. Id.at 1176.
257. Id.at 1176-77. The plaintiff had previously pled guilty to possession of
cocaine and marijuana.

258. Id.
259. Id. at 1176 n.3.
260. See id.
at 1181.
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was "antithetical to the principal purpose of Title VII, "' in that it did
not serve to discourage discriminatory employment practices.'
Allowing an employer the luxury of going through an employee's files
after he or she was illegally discharged to search for any evidence of
misrepresentation that could lead to a summary judgment in the
employer's favor would hardly cause employers to scrutinize their
unlawful employment practices.' Rather, the end result of applying the
majority approach would likely be that employers would have an incentive
to sandbag their employees.'
Thus, the Summers approach could
actually lead to increased occurrences of employment discrimination. 5
Furthermore, the Wallace court felt that the Summers approach to
after-acquired evidence failed to advance the other purpose of Title VII,
that of making the victim of discrimination whole.'
Citing Mount
Healthy for the proposition that the victim of employee discrimination
should not be placed in a worse position by virtue of his protected status
than those employees who did not have protected status, the Wallace court
held that an application of the Summers approach would leave employees
in a worse position. 7 Unlawfully-discharged employees would be
denied all relief based on after-acquired evidence of their
misrepresentation or misconduct that was unrelated to their discharge,
although if it was not for the employer's discriminatory conduct the
employees would have remained employed for some time after they were
actually discharged (presumably until the evidence was discovered).26
The Eleventh Circuit believed that the Summers approach, therefore,
"constitute[d] an unwarranted extension of Mount Healthy"'' because
it "ignore[d] the lapse of time between the employment decision and the
261. Id. at 1180.
262. See id.
263. Id.
264. ld. By sandbagging, the Eleventh Circuit was afraid that, under the Tenth
Circuit's approach, employers who tended to discriminate would set artificially low
standards for termination, hire a member of a protected class knowing that he or she
violated these low standards, and discriminate against the employee until he or she
complained. Then, the employer could discharge the employee. If the employer chose
to file an action, the employer could then pretend to have just discovered the violation
and successfully move for summary judgment.
265. See id. at 1181.
266. See id. at 1182.
267. See id. at 1179-80.
268. Id.
269. ld. at 1179.
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discovery of a legitimate motive for that decision."270 While Mount
Healthy excused an employer's liability based on the decision it would
have made absent the allegedly unlawful motive, the Wallace court
construed Summers as allowing an employer to avoid all liability based on
what hypothetically would have occurred absent the discriminatory
motive.2 1
Rather than bar the plaintiff's claim, then, the Wallace court held that
when after-acquired evidence would have provided the employer with a
legitimate reason to discharge the employee, the plaintiff could recover
back-pay, attorney's fees, and nominal damages.'
Back-pay could be
reduced only if the employer established that it would have discovered the
evidence on its own absent any discriminatory practices.'
Reinstatement, front-pay and injunctive relief, however, would be
unavailable.4 The court felt that its approach succeeded in balancing the
interests of the wronged employee against those of the employer who now
had a legitimate reason to have discharged that employee.275
D. The Floodgates are Closed (ForNow):
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.
On January 23, 1995, the Supreme Court decided McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,276 holding unanimously that an
aggrieved employee could not be barred from all relief when, following
her discharge, her employer discovered evidence of wrongdoing that, had
it been discovered while she was employed, would have led to her
termination on lawful and legitimate grounds.'7 This decision had been
eagerly anticipated, 8 and, at first glance, the Court appears to have
sounded the death knell for the after-acquired evidence doctrine.
However, a closer look reveals that its decision, while a welcome step in
weakening the strength of the after-acquired evidence doctrine, does not
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 1182.
Id.

274. Id. at 1174.
275. See id. at 1181.
276. 115 S.Ct. 879 (1995).
277. Id. at 883.
278. See Supreme Court Says Employee Misdeeds Don'tShield Employersfrom Bias
Claims, U.S.L.W., Jan. 31, 1995 (stating that the decision was "one of the most closely
watched employment cases of the term.").
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go far enough to maintain the ideals of antidiscrimination legislation
articulated throughout this note.
Christine MeKennon worked for the Nashville Banner Publishing
Company for 39 years.'
When she was discharged, it was ostensibly
as part of a plan to reduce the work force due to financial
considerations.'
McKennon, who was 62 years old at the time of her
discharge, felt that she had lost her job due to her age. 1 As such, she
filed a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.24
While preparing for trial, MeKennon was deposed by the Banner.'
During her deposition, she testified that in her last year of employment
she had photocopied several confidential documents relating to the
Banner's financial condition; documents to which she had access in her
position as secretary to the Banner's comptroller. '
She testified that
she was apprehensive about losing her job for a pretextual reason, and she
wanted to have the documents for "protection. ""
Several days after McKennon's deposition, she received a letter from
the Banner stating that her removal and copying of the records was a
violation of company policy, and that had they been aware of this
misconduct she would have been discharged immediately. 6 At trial,
the Banner moved for summary judgment, conceding its discrimination
against McKennon.Y The District Court granted this motion, holding that
McKennon's conduct in removing and photocopying company documents
was proper grounds for her termination and that this misconduct barred
her from all relief." The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed, adopting the same rationale. 9
279. Marcia Coyle, After-Acquired Evidence Argued, NAT. L.J., Nov. 14, 1994,
at A13.
280. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 882.
281. Id. at 882-83.
282. Id. at 883. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 [hereinafter
ADEA] makes it illegal for any employer "to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age ...... 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1).
283. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari, in part to resolve the circuit
split that is detailed earlier in this section. In a unanimous decision, the
Court reversed the lower courts' rulings and remanded the case to the
Sixth Circuit.'
Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion for the Court,
felt that the Sixth Circuit had been incorrect when it held that McKennon's
misconduct made it irrelevant whether she had in fact been discriminated
against."' Justice Kennedy launched into a description of the historical
background of the ADEA, and he correctly placed the ADEA in its larger
context, describing it as "part of a wider statutory scheme to protect
employees in the workplace nationwide."I Justice Kennedy's opinion
analogized the ADEA to Title VII, stating that they "share common
substantive features and also a common purpose: 'the elimination of
discrimination in the workplace.'" '
According to an attorney for the
American Association of Retired Persons, which filed an amicus brief on
behalf of Christine McKennon, the Court's decision applies to several
employment discrimination statutes, including Title VII.2 4
The McKennon decision should not have come as much of a surprise
to anyone who observed the oral arguments before the Court.
McKennon's attorney argued that "no matter what the employee has done,
in the context of Title VII or ADEA, the wrongdoing does not remove
'
him from the protections of federal law."295
The Banner's attorney
averred that "'Congress did not intend the discrimination laws to benefit
employees who are bad apples.'"2
The Justices' remarks during questioning made it clear where they
stood on this issue. Justice Scalia remarked that use of the after-acquired
evidence clause might discourage employees who were victims of
employment discrimination from bringing suits against their employers for
fear that their "entire work record will be scrutinized, and evidence of
incompetence exposed to possible future employers."' °
Justice
O'Connor, responding to the Banner's attorney, stated that she was unable
to see how the Banner's position "'effectuates the goal of [the ADEA] at
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

294. Supreme Court Says Employee Misdeeds Don't Shield Employersfrom Bias
Claims, U.S.L.W., Jan. 31, 1995.
295. JusticesDebateAfter-Acquired EvidenceasDevice toDefeatJob BiasLiability,
U.S.L.W., Nov. 3, 1994.
296. Id. (quoting Scalia, J.).
297. Id.
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all.'"
And Justice Ginsburg opined that the after-acquired evidence
doctrine "turns the statute on its head by permitting an inquiry into
whether the employee engaged in misconduct or is otherwise
incompetent. "I Ginsburg was relentless in her belief that employees who
were victims of employment discrimination must be allowed to have their
day in court."
Although the Court ruled that lawsuits could not be thrown out of
court merely because the employer obtained after-acquired evidence of
wrongdoing, it also ruled that such after-acquired evidence was relevant
in determining the amount of damages that an aggrieved employee could
expect to recover, despite the purposes of federal antidiscrimination
statutes."
In so ruling, the Court recognized what it termed "the
duality between the legitimate interests of the employer and the important
claims of the employee . . "I and held that "[t]he employee's
wrongdoing must be taken into account ... lest the employer's legitimate
concerns be ignored."'
The Court noted that the ADEA "does not
constrain employers from exercising other prerogatives and discretions in
the course of the hiring, promoting, and discharging of their
employees. " ' So what appears to be a major victory for aggrieved
employees, what has been called "the death knell of the Summers
rule,"' 5 in fact will not do much to deter employee misconduct, because
employers will still be able to engage in discriminatory employment
practices with little in the way of penalties.'
Although "McKennon
reinforces the central statutory purposes of the anti-discrimination laws,
namely, to eliminate discrimination from the workplace and to compensate
victims of such unlawful discrimination,"'
stronger action is required
to completely eradicate the use of after-acquired evidence in employment
discrimination cases, as the next section will elaborate upon.
"

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
Supreme

Id. (quoting O'Connor, J.).
Id.
Id.
McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 239).
Hyman Lovitz and Sidney Gold, After-Acquired Evidence Defense is Rejected;
Court Decision Boosts Plaintiff's Cause in Bias Suits, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 9, 1995, at 9, 10.
306. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
307. Lovitz and Gold, supra note 307, at 9, 10.
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4. Entrenchment and Wide Acceptance. of the After-Acquired Evidence
Doctrine
As this section has discussed, the use of after-acquired evidence of
employee misrepresentation or misconduct to bar employment
discrimination claims or to limit the relief plaintiffs can recover had
become a widely-accepted doctrine in our federal court system. 8
While the doctrine was originally utilized in the context of a Title VII
action,' it had been applied to cases involving state laws;310 even the
EEOC, which is charged with enforcement of Title VII, went on record
as supporting the doctrine, although only in its limited Eleventh Circuit
application.
However, as one commentator has put it, "[t]here is something wrong
with a body of law that allows an employer to cover up its illegal activities
Title
by searching an employee's past for unknown falsification."
VII's primary objective has been described as the "elimination of the
"..."313 The after-acquired
major social ills of job discrimination .
evidence doctrine, which allowed employers to defend themselves against
charges of employment discrimination while suffering little or no harm,
ran counter to this purpose by failing to provide incentives for employers
to halt their unlawful employment practices and by failing to make the
308. See supra notes 159-275 and accompanying text.
309. See Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.
1988) (employee alleged discrimination based on his age and religion, characteristics
specifically protected by Title VII).
310. See, e.g., Johnsonv. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992)
(applying doctrine to Michigan law); Baab v. AMR Serv. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246
(N.D. Ohio 1993) (applying doctrine to Ohio law); O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992) (applying doctrine to Arizona law);
O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1990) (applying doctrine to
Utah law).
311. See EEOC Office of General Counsel Memorandum re. Litigation Guidance
on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Related Matters, March 1, 1993 (Reprinted in 1993
DLR No. 41, at F-1 et seq. (Mar. 4, 1993)). Although the approach taken by the EEOC
may seem contradictory in light of its mandate to ensure that Title VII is enforced, the
EEOC has often been criticized, especially in the recent past, as ineffective and as
"fail[ing] to fulfill its mandate to resolve individual charges [of employment
discrimination]." Hill, supranote 32, at 94.
312. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of PredischargeMisconductDiscoveredAfter
an Employee's Termination as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1, 28 (1990).
313. EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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victims of discrimination whole.314 The doctrine punished the victim of
employment discrimination twice-the first time as an employee
discharged for a discriminatory reason, and the second time as a plaintiff
denied any relief. 315 As such, it was properly invalidated by the
Supreme Court in McKennon. The next section explores in detail how the
after-acquired evidence doctrine subverted the purposes of Title VII, and
discusses what steps should be taken by Congress, in the wake of the
McKennon decision, to guarantee that this evidence, which is unrelated to
the adverse employment decision, is rendered inadmissible in cases where
there has been a showing of discrimination by the employer. 16
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THE LEGISLATIVE INVALIDATION
OF THE AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINE

A. The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine
Failed to Discourage Employment Discrimination
As indicated earlier, Title VII was enacted, after a furious battle, with
the aim of eradicating one of the most serious social problems our country
faced in the 1960's-discrimination, principally against minorities, in the
workforce.317 Title VII served to further this purpose by prohibiting
employers from using characteristics such as race, sex, religion, color, or
national origin as the basis for an adverse employment decision, be it a
refusal to hire, refusal to advance or promote, or discharge of an
Title VII offered alleged victims of employment
employee. 318
discrimination the opportunity to bring an action against their employer
and recover damages. 19 It was felt that employers, faced with the
prospect of costly litigation and large awards to employees who had been
discriminated against, would see fit to halt their discriminatory
To further this policy, and to correct
employment practices.'2
perceived deficiencies with the original legislation, Congress has amended
Title VII on several occasions." These amendments have expanded the
314.
two goals
315.
316.
317.
designed
318.
319.
320.
321.

See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (describing the
Congress intended to achieve through the enactment of Title VII).
See Follette, supra note 59, at 671.
See infra text accompanying notes 311-18.

See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 416 (describing how Title VII was
to eradicate "a historic evil of national proportions").
See supra text accompanying notes 32-41.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 417-18.
See supra Part II.
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pool of employees who are qualified for protection pursuant to Title
VII,1 increased the power of the EEOC to enforce the provisions of
Title VlI,1 allowed for jury trials, 3' allowed for increased remedies
to aggrieved plaintiffs in certain situations, 3' and prohibited employers
from avoiding liability in mixed motive cases; cases where an adverse
employment decision was made based on both protected and unprotected
characteristics. 3" Upon viewing these changes, it becomes clear that
Congress has attempted over the years to increase the incentives for
employers to stop their unlawful practices.
By allowing employers who were guilty of discrimination to use afteracquired evidence of employee misrepresentation or misconduct to avoid
liability, the doctrine failed to provide an incentive for these employers to
eliminate discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody implied this, stating that, "employers fac[ing] only
the prospect of an injunctive order ... would have little incentive to shun
practices of dubious legality."327 The Court went on to say that it was
the probability of having to pay damages to victims of employment
discrimination that "provide[s] the spur or catalyst" 3" for employers to
"endeavor to eliminate . . . the last vestiges of an unfortunate and
ignominious page in this country's history."'" When dealing with cases
involving discrimination, a major social ill in our society, courts have "the
duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the
future. " °
By allowing employers to discriminate against their
322. For example, the 1972 Act extended Title VII to government employees, while
the 1991 CRA extended protection to American employees of American companies who
were employed overseas. See supra Section II.
323. See supratext accompanying notes 66-76.
324. See supratext accompanying notes 124-32.
325. The 1991 CRA allowed plaintiffs to recover punitive and compensatory
damages in cases of intentional discrimination. See supratext accompanying notes 11923.
326. See supratext accompanying notes 138-53.
327. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
328. Id. (quoting United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir.
1973)).
329. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418.
330. Id. (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
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employees with impunity, courts across the country shirked their
obligation to uphold the principles behind Title VII. 33'
The Eleventh Circuit, which rejected the Summers court's application

of the after-acquired evidence doctrine, recognized that the majorit'y
approach was "antithetical to the principal purpose of Title VII ....

It believed that the Tenth Circuit's approach, which would essentially
provide an affirmative defense to Title VII, would actually encourage
employers to continue their discriminatory practices.3 33 The Wallace
court felt that its approach, which would only allow the use of afteracquired evidence to reduce the remedies available to the victim, was
more equitable. 3' However, this application was at odds with Title VII's
principal purpose as well-by making it less costly for employers to
discriminate, the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine also failed to provide incentives for employers to
eliminate unlawful employment practices. 3 Employers in jurisdictions

applying the Wallace court's construction of the doctrine could rest secure
in the knowledge that they would never have to pay out frontpay, punitive
331. See, e.g., Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 767 F. Supp.
1403 (W.D. Mich. 1991), rev'd, 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
2991 (1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993). In this case, the plaintiff, a public
safety officer, was clearly the victim of flagrant sexual discrimination at the hands of her
fellow officers and superiors. However, after-acquired evidence that she had failed to
disclose a prior conviction for driving under the influence led to the Sixth Circuit
granting summary judgment for the employer.
332. Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 1992).
333. See id. The Eleventh Circuit felt that use of such evidence to totally bar
employees' claims could lead to instances of abuse. An employer might learn of an
employee's misrepresentation or misconduct while he or she was still employed and keep
this information a secret. The employer would then be free to discriminate against that
employee, secure in the knowledge that if he or she was taken to court for violating
employment discrimination laws, this evidence could then be supposedly discovered and
used to successfully move for summary judgment.
334. See id. at 1184. The plaintiff was denied the remedies of reinstatement,
frontpay, and injunctive relief.
335. Under the Eleventh Circuit's approach, defendants would never have to pay
more than back-pay (measured from the time of discharge to the time of the judgment),
attorney's fees, and nominal damages. The Wallace decision has also been criticized by
several commentators. See Hugh Lawson, III, Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.:
Defining the Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Federal Employment Discrimination
Suits, 44 MERcER L. REv. 1469, 1469 (1993) (describing the court's holding as "too
complicated to be feasible") Id.; Muth, supra note 9, at 332 (arguing that the court's
arguments were "somewhat suspect").

19941

NOTE: AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE

or compensatory damages, even if the 336
plaintiff could establish a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination.
Therefore, even under the more equitable construction that the
Eleventh Circuit had given it, the after-acquired evidence doctrine allowed
employers to discriminate with little, if any, cost, and thus did not provide
them with any incentive to eliminate their discriminatory employment
practices.
B. The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine
Failedto Make the Victim Whole
The second tenet of Title VII, as characterized by Albemarle, was to
"make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination."3 37 The make-whole objective is evidenced
by the wide discretionary powers Congress granted the courts to fashion
"the most complete relief possible.""
This discretionary power was
given to the courts to ensure that victims of employment discrimination
were, "so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have
been were it not for the unlawful discrimination." " Therefore, courts,
in considering remedies, must consider the purposes behind Title VII.
The make whole purpose of Title VII is also evidenced in the 1991
Civil Rights Act, which allowed for the recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages in cases when the plaintiff could establish intentional
discrimination."
Apparently, these remedies, which were not made
available in Title VIl's original enactment, were made available because
it was believed that, in cases of intentional discrimination, the damage
inflicted on the victim of employment discrimination could not be
336. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1184. This is contrary to the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
which allowed for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages if the plaintiff
could establish that the employer acted with "malice" or "reckless indifference." See
42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(a)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992). To date, only one other federal court
has followed the Wallace court's construction of the after-acquired evidence doctrine.
Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314 (D. N.J. 1993).
337. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
338. 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972) (analyzing the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972) (statement of Sen. Williams).
339. Id.
340. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421 (noting that Title VII had been enacted to
eliminate the scourge of employment discrimination and to make its victims whole
through court-ordered relief).
341. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
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measured in merely economic terms. 4 Furthermore, in pre-amendment
situations where the available damages were insignificant or undesirable,
many individuals would not bother to file claims and go through the costly
litigation process.'
With the addition of possible punitive and

compensatory damages, these individuals would have more incentive to
bring their claims to the EEOC, because they now stood a better chance
of being made whole.'
In providing for jury trials, Congress also
intended to make it easier for plaintiffs to be made whole by allowing

them to plead their cases before a jury rather than before a panel of
judges.'
The after-acquired evidence doctrine failed to make the victims of
employment discrimination whole.'
The former majority approach, as

articulated by the Summers court, argued that after-acquired evidence of
employee misrepresentation or misconduct negated the plaintiff's injury,

and therefore denied the plaintiff any relief.47 By denying the victim
of employment discrimination any relief because of unrelated factors, even

if it was undisputed that discrimination took place," the Tenth Circuit's
construction of the doctrine was clearly contrary to the make whole
principle of Title VII.
The Eleventh Circuit's application of the doctrine likewise failed to

make the victim of employment discrimination whole."

Although some

342. See LARSON, supranote 117, at 11 (describing how new remedies were made
available because for many plaintiffs, "existing remedies were simply not adequate").
343. For example, individuals who were refused employment because of their race
or religion would probably feel uncomfortable, to say the least, in subsequently accepting
the position if the company was forced to hire them by a court order. See LARSON,
supra note 117, at 11 (pre-existing remedies would hardly make it worthwhile for many
plaintiffs to stand up for their rights).
344. See id.
345. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
346. See Follette, supranote 59, at 664 (describing how the Tenth Circuit approach
does not place the victim of discrimination in the same position he or she would have
been in absent the discrimination).
347. See Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700,708 (10th Cir.
1988).
348. Indeed, in granting summary judgment, courts generally assume that the
discrimination took place. See e.g., Summers, 864 F.2d at 708 ("[lit is assumed that
State Farm was motivated, at least in part, if not substantially, because of Summers' age
and religion.").
349. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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relief was made available to the plaintiff, 350 the denial of reinstatement,
front pay or injunctive relief (to say nothing of compensatory and punitive
damages) resulted in the victim of discrimination being left in a worse
position than he or she would have been had the discrimination not
occurred, which is contrary to Congress's intention in enacting Title
VII.351

Under the after-acquired evidence doctrine, the plaintiff in an
employment discrimination case was penalized by evidence of his or her
resume fraud or misconduct,35 even though it was not known to the
employer at the time of the discharge, and only came to light during the
preparation for trial. 353
Had it not been for the employer's
discrimination, which resulted in the litigation, the chances are that the
evidence would not have been discovered, if at all, until sometime later
in the future.3' This means that the employee would have remained
employed until the evidence was discovered, at which point the employer
would be justified in discharging the employee. However, it is nearly
impossible to predict exactly when the evidence would have been
discovered. Therefore, by allowing the employer to move for summary
judgment upon presentation of this after-acquired evidence, courts allowed
the employer to benefit from his or her own illegal activity.' 5 This was
so because, according to the Eleventh Circuit, prospective relief would
have been denied to the plaintiff when the employer presented evidence
that would have resulted in the employee's discharge had it been
discovered.'
However, the employee might have remained employed
long past the judgment date; in such a case, since the award of back-pay
350. A victorious plaintiff in the Eleventh Circuit could recover back-pay, attorney's
fees, and nominal damages. See Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174,
1182 (11th Cir. 1992).
351. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (describing
Congress's intent, in enacting Title VII, to "make persons whole for injuries suffered on
account of unlawful employment discrimination").
352. See Waldo & Mahar, supra note 195, at 31.
353. In a typical case, evidence of the employee's misconduct or misrepresentation
will be revealed either during inspection of records before trial or upon deposition of the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992)
(evidence of resume fraud revealed during Johnson's deposition); Summers v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988) (evidence of falsifications
uncovered following inspection of records).
354. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 1992)
(employer only became aware of plaintiff's resume fraud during pre-trial deposition).
355. See Follette, supra note 59, at 664 (describing how the doctrine gives
employers a "windfall"). Id.
356. See supra notes 251-75 and accompanying text.
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was capped at the judgment date, the plaintiff was essentially penalized by
being unable to recover for the time he or she might potentially have
remained employed had the employer not engaged in discriminatory
employment practices.
Thus, by denying any prospective relief, the Eleventh Circuit
approach, although it granted the victim of employment discrimination
some recovery (as opposed to the Tenth Circuit's total proscription of
relief), did not allow sufficient relief to satisfy the objectives of Title
VI-to ensure that "persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of
unlawful employment practices be, so far as possible, restored to the
position where they would" have been were it not for the unlawful
discrimination. 3 7
C. Congress Should Amend Title VII to Invalidate the
Use of After-Acquired Evidence in
Employment DiscriminationLitigation
As has been shown earlier in this note, on three separate occasions
Congress has seen fit to expand the scope and protection of Title VII. s
Despite the Court's recent ruling in McKennon, Congress should amend
Title VII once again to guarantee the invalidation the admissibility of afteracquired evidence in employment discrimination litigation. The doctrine
flew in the face of both the Congressional intent in enacting Title VII and
the general societal goal of eliminating discrimination.3 59 Congress
should take measures to nullify this doctrine, to go beyond the Court's
holding in McKennon, because in the past several years the Court has
proven itself to be very unpredictable in the area of employment
discrimination law.'
The proposed amendment should ban the use of after-acquired
evidence only in those cases where the plaintiff can establish a prima facie
357. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,764 (1976) (citing 118 CONG.

REC. 7166, 7168 (1972)).
358. See supra notes 61-153 and accompanying text.
359. See Douglas L. Williams & Julia A. Davis, Title VI Update- Skeletons and a
Double-Edged Sword, C669 A.L.I. A.B.A. 303 (1991). The authors state that a strong
argument can be made for the proposition that "the public policy and congressional intent
underlying Title VII requires that ...a finding of [employment] discrimination requires
a remedy without the consideration of after-acquired evidence." Id. at 309.
360. See Neumeier, supranote 120, at 500 (describing how the Supreme Court has
been inconsistent in its interpretation of civil rights cases since the 1989 term); Simon,
supra note 19, at 221 (describing how, in the same term, the Court extended greater
protection to employees in one decision while giving employers discretion to discriminate
in another case).
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case of employment discrimination. This would avoid any abuses that
might anger business interests, who have fought Congress on Title VII
since its inception. 6 ' The proposed amendment would firmly emphasize
Congress's commitment to the original goals of Title VII-the elimination
of discrimination from our workplaces and redressing all harm done to the
victims of employment discrimination.362 By proscribing the use of
after-acquired evidence, Congress would eliminate a strategy that has been
used by many employers who have eluded culpability for their illegal
actions by shifting all the blame onto the victims of discrimination for
conduct unrelated to their discharge.'
This would allow the full force
of Title VII to be brought against violative employers, and would
consequently serve to discourage employment discrimination. 3"
V.

CONCLUSION

Employment discrimination has been described as one of the "major
social ills" 3" of our society. Title VII was enacted to combat this evil
by compelling employers to cease their discriminatory employment
practices and by making the victims of employment discrimination
vhole.? The after-acquired evidence doctrine subverted the purposes
of Title VII by punishing the victims of employment discrimination for
conduct unrelated to their discharge while allowing employers to avoid
liability at little or no cost.367 Although the Supreme Court's recent
ruling in McKennon is a welcome start, Congress must take action on its

361. See Hill, supra note 32, at 4, 33 (describing how business interests were
fiercely opposed to both Title VII and the 1972 Act that expanded its scope).
362. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415, 418 (1975).
363. See, e.g., Johnsonv. HoneywellInfo. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992)
(evidence of employee's misrepresentations defeated her claim of retaliatory discharge);
Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988) (former
employee's claims of age and religious discrimination defeated by evidence of prior
misconduct).
364. See Loudon, supra note 118 (discussing how new remedy and jury trial
provisions of 1991 CRA would lead to increased litigation and would thus lead employers
to change their evil ways).
365. EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 180 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
366. See supra text accompanying notes 32-44.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 173-275.
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own to nullify the after-acquired evidence doctrine. Such action would be
consistent with earlier congressional action, 31 and would go a long way
towards ensuring that the purposes of Title VII are fulfilled.
Martin Adler

368. See supra Part II.

